Philosophy based on indirect perception (IP) cannot use the traditional philosophical methodology or the mainstream philosophicl approach to language and, as a result it is unlikely to be accepted by philosophers who practice in this area. However, it should get some support from philosophers that adopt an IP perspective and possibly from neuroscientists with an interest in philosophy.
It must first distance itself from “facts about the environment”. As it is based on a representational system IP philosophy is limited to representations so it must stay within the boundaries that Karl Popper has constructed for science with his falsification thesis. In brief, the models we create to represent the environment (and those representations created for us in perception) can be shown to be adequate or inadequate (for some purpose), but they cannot be shown to be true (meaning identical to what they represent). This is a serious limitation, as it has to be accepted that the perceptual and theoretical models IP comes up with are representations and can never become a part of the external world that is represented by these models.
Because it cannot claim to present facts about the environment, this indirect perception philosophy (IPP) has to follow a different road to DPP. Much of DP philosophy is devoted to arguing that some philosophical theory is false, or at least there are major problems with it. From an IPP perspective this is not necessary as it is accepted that all the models it discusses are simplistic representations; they are incomplete and have varying degrees of accuracy and so simply pointing out that they are simplistic and have limitations is not particularly helpful.
Instead of focusing mainly on criticism, IPP has to engage in constructing models, specifying their limitations, critically analysing them, modify them and repeating this cycle. The critical analysis is still present, but it is directed at the model and the relationship between the model and the environment. The approach I am using here illustrates this change. Instead of engaging in an extended discussion on philosophical theories of perception, I adopt a neuroscience model that represents how perception works. I then investigate the consequences that must follow if this model is adopted. If this model is to be an adequate representation, it must not lead to impossible consequences. The analysis identifies the consequences and investigates their feasibility.
IPP must take great care with its language. DP does not need perceptual models and its language can refer directly to the environment, while IP must include models and must interpret language in a way that acknowledges that the language refers to the model and can only refer to the environment via that model. The way someone uses language is therefore an indicator of that person’s (possibly unexamined) view of perception. If the writer uses language in a way that suggests he or she is discussing the world, or facts about the world (rather than the model, and/or facts about the model) this suggests that they have (intentionally or unintentionally) adopted a DP perspective.
Alternatively, if they use language in a way that indicates that they are discussing models (and/or facts about the models) this indicates that they have adopted an indirect perception theory. It seems therefore that one has to choose either DP or IP before adopting a method of using and interpreting the language to be used to discuss the DP/IP issue. We must use language – there is no alternative - and so since we must choose our DP/IP theory along with a consistent way of using language it does not seem as if there can be philosophical engagement over the issue of DP/IP that is not biased to one side or the other by the language used. Are we going to discuss models of the environment or the environment? Choosing one or the other automatically biases the discussion. We seem to be bound to one approach or the other and so we are limited to an examination of the situation from one or other of these perspectives – realizing that the perspective we choose will influence how we think about the issues.
How can we proceed? The method I propose is to recognise that the IP perspective is more detailed than the DP perspective (it adopts a lower level of abstraction) and when this is the case it is sometimes possible to use abstraction to simplify the more detailed perspective in a way that leads to the less detailed perspective. It seems feasible that an IP perspective can be abstracted (detail removed) to create the DP perspective. When trying to create a bridge between the two, in conjunction with this abstraction we can simplify the language used and so when we use language to refer directly to the environment we can think of this as an abstraction from the more detailed (and more precise) use of language (to refer to the mental representation directly and to the environment via this representation). This forms a way of transitioning from IP to DP, but in doing this it assumes that DP is a simplified form of IP that can be used when a more detailed approach is unnecessary.
For many applications this abstraction can be done without serious consequences. We can go about our daily life without being concerned about the difference between DP and IP and the way we interpret language. However, when we want to examine perceptual and linguistic issue critically, we have to be on guard to avoid being misled (by this use of language) into adopting a direct perception perspective. So while using language, as we normally do, we need to periodically remind ourselves that we are not to interpret this as referring directly to the world. A good way of doing this is to periodically adopt language that remind us that the simpler way of using language is an abstraction that can be misleading. I plan to do this here and so if I use language that makes it appear that I am referring directly to the environment please interpret it from an IP perspective.
With respect to the methodology associated with IPP, I plan to build models based on what we reliably know about human abilities (as claimed by neuroscience) our behaviour and what we are mentally capable of doing. The models proposed by the neuroscientists have to be abstracted to remove unnecessary detail so we can have a model that is detailed enough for philosophical purposes, but not so detailed that it creates a distraction. As this can lead to the creation of competing models, there will be opportunities for analysis to help select a successful model.
In this blog I propose to engage in this process starting with a simple models and evolve these to the point where they seem intuitively acceptable and can contribute to our understanding of ourselves and the world we live in. Before starting however, let me roughly indicate how IPP can have influence far beyond the philosophical world and become very relevant to our social and scientific communities.
It won’t have very much effect on our everyday use of language, but as philosophers tend to use and interpret language much more precisely it will have a profound effect on the philosophy of language and as philosophy is highly dependant on language this will have a wide impact within philosophy.
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