Two ways to model Language
When we assume we are capable of direct perception (DP) we assume see material objects directly and assume that we can use language to refer directly to material objects. With these assumptions in place analytic philosophers continue to work on a DP language theory in which words refer directly to material objects. This language theory is fraught with difficulties and is very restrictive, but they persist.
When we take different approach, recognise the limitations imposed by the science of perception and accept that we become conscious of representations of our surroundings we need to create a language theory that is coherent with this approach. To do this we can have language refer to the forms we become conscious of. When these forms represent material objects words can refer to the material objects via the forms. In this theory the word 'tree' refers to the mental form 'tree' that we become conscious of. This provides the flexibility for the word 'tree' to refer to material trees and conceptual trees such as decision trees via the form 'tree'. In this RP language theory words always refer to mental forms and through these to whatever the mental form represents.
While DP language theory limit words to referring directly to material objects, RP language theory can refer to any form that appears in consciousness. It is much more flexible and avoids several problems that appear when DP and DP language theory is adopted. Using RP language theory we can, for example, refer to holes, valleys, shadows and the like. Here we are using words to refer to mental forms that are not representative of material objects.
Articles in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy such as, (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/holes/) discuss some of the theoretical problems that occur when we assume a DP paradigm. These problems seem to disappear when a RP paradigm is assumed; a strong endorsement for RP.
RP creates a paradigm that is theoretically different from the DP paradigm normally assumed in analytic philosophy. It should be easy for philosophers to switch from the DP paradigm to the RP paradigm, but there is much emotional resistance to doing this.
The resistance is largely due to the assumption made by analytic philosophers that they must have facts. They always fail to find perceptual facts, but they are so caught up in the need for facts that they do not realise that there are better alternatives. RP shows that facts are not available via perception, as there is always the possibility that the forms we become conscious of are not a good enough representation of what is being perceived.
RP also provides a way of doing philosophy without facts. This requires a different methodology, but it is very difficult for analytic philosophers to make the switch to RP, accept the presence of mental models and adopt a methodology that does not require facts.
When we take different approach, recognise the limitations imposed by the science of perception and accept that we become conscious of representations of our surroundings we need to create a language theory that is coherent with this approach. To do this we can have language refer to the forms we become conscious of. When these forms represent material objects words can refer to the material objects via the forms. In this theory the word 'tree' refers to the mental form 'tree' that we become conscious of. This provides the flexibility for the word 'tree' to refer to material trees and conceptual trees such as decision trees via the form 'tree'. In this RP language theory words always refer to mental forms and through these to whatever the mental form represents.
While DP language theory limit words to referring directly to material objects, RP language theory can refer to any form that appears in consciousness. It is much more flexible and avoids several problems that appear when DP and DP language theory is adopted. Using RP language theory we can, for example, refer to holes, valleys, shadows and the like. Here we are using words to refer to mental forms that are not representative of material objects.
Articles in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy such as, (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/holes/) discuss some of the theoretical problems that occur when we assume a DP paradigm. These problems seem to disappear when a RP paradigm is assumed; a strong endorsement for RP.
RP creates a paradigm that is theoretically different from the DP paradigm normally assumed in analytic philosophy. It should be easy for philosophers to switch from the DP paradigm to the RP paradigm, but there is much emotional resistance to doing this.
The resistance is largely due to the assumption made by analytic philosophers that they must have facts. They always fail to find perceptual facts, but they are so caught up in the need for facts that they do not realise that there are better alternatives. RP shows that facts are not available via perception, as there is always the possibility that the forms we become conscious of are not a good enough representation of what is being perceived.
RP also provides a way of doing philosophy without facts. This requires a different methodology, but it is very difficult for analytic philosophers to make the switch to RP, accept the presence of mental models and adopt a methodology that does not require facts.
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